Application of the funding GAP method in the process of financing regional development in Romania by Oana GHERGHINESCU
178                                                                        Finance – Challenges of the Future 
 
ABOUT THE US TRADE DEFICIT AND THE US “EASY 
MONEY” POLICY 
 
Lect. Sabin RIZESCU, PhD 
Lect. Cristian STANCIU, PhD 




As the US economy continues to 
be the largest in the world and – despite 
the recent troubles – continues to remain 
the most valuable in terms of 
competitiveness, the US Dollar is likely to 
continue to keep its world reserve 
currency status. In this kind of respect, 
there are a lot of discussions (most of 
them contradictory) taking place but this 
paper will not be part of them. We    will 
neither discuss the reasons why US 
became in a position to run huge trade 
deficits during the last two decades, 




First, we have to point out that 
the US economy did generate high 
added value at high productivity levels in 
mid and late 90s and even during the 
2000-2005 period of time. Right after the 
fall of communism (1989-1992) in the 
former Soviet Union and in Central and 
Eastern Europe, US had to deal with 
many world spread armed conflicts and 
the involvement of US in those conflicts 
had to be financed. In the meantime, the 
US economy, as well as the rest of 
economies of developed capitalist 
countries (G7 group) had to face a quite 
severe economic downturn. At that time 
the US economy was in a relative good 
position and that mainly because it 
became to generate high added value 
goods and services at high productivity 
levels during the 1979-1987 period of 
time when Fed, having the famous Paul 
Volcker as chairman, conducted a very 
tight monetary policy by operating many 
and significant interest rates hikes. Also, 
the Treasury Department, under the wise 
leadership of Donald Regan released 
some quantitative-appropriate and 
investing-orientated stimulus packages. 
This smart and complementarily-based 
combination between the monetary and 
fiscal policy prized the work rather than 
investment in risky and exotic financial 
assets. More else, due to the high 
interest rates and low inflation economic 
environment, people were cautious in 
buying or building expensive houses 
usually considered some sort of safe 
haven assets in times of inflationary 
pressures. We have to add to the picture 
that, in this kind of economic environment 
people kept consumption somehow in 
check and at sustainable levels while 
remained work and saving-oriented. As 
result, the US was the very first country 
where, among many other achievements, 
the first PC computer as we know it today 
was created and US was the also the 
country that putted at the world’s disposal 
the magic product called “the Internet”. 
We also have to point out that, during the 
80s, the achievements in the computers 
industry lead to increased performances 
in the banking and financial industries, 
first in the US, and, then, quite rapidly, in 
the rest of the world economy. It was also 
the time when Hollywood entered into the 
digital era and the entertainment of high-
class became available to everyone. In 
this kind of respect, we have to add to 
the picture that, despite the Middle East 
complicated situation (… which, by the 
way, is always complicated) the refined 
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indeed (US was and, still, is the biggest 
oil importer in the world), but not as high 
as they could have been because the 
ongoing digital achievements created 
some sort of new “stay at home” kind of 
culture, the way that people became less 
tempted to use their cars. So, the US 
trade deficit stayed rather contained 
during the 80s. 
In 1990 the Iraq tensions 
sparked out. The oil prices reached 
levels they didn’t before and the world 
economy slept into recession. This 
recession was to be more severe in US 
as bigger oil importer in the world. Due to 
this situation, Fed took the normal 
measure by slashing interest rates from 
around 6% in 1990 to 3% in 1992. And, 
at that time, this measure was as best as 
it could be considering the enormous 
productivity reserve US had accumulated 
in the 80s. More else, the Fed’s interest 
rates cuts in early 90s drove down the 
US Dollar and that made cheaper all 
goods and services “made in USA” and, 
this way, a good part of those high added 
value products conceived and 
manufactured in US became suddenly 
competitive in the world. Growth came 
back starting with February 1993 and all 
the rest of the world followed suit. The 
world demand for high performance 
American made digital and computer 
equipments increased at an incredible 
pace and was to last for the almost the 
90s decade. The growth in the US’s GDP 
was spectacular during the 90s and even 
in 2000 and 2001 despite the terrorist 
attacks at the World Trade Center. The 
US trade deficit with the rest of the world 
had risen but, due to the respectable 
pace of growth in terms of GDP, didn’t 
represent too much concern to the US 
authorities. More else, the US 
international trade didn’t and doesn’t 
count too much as GDP ratio. For 
example, the US international trade gap 
touched a pick in 1987, but it was only 
2.5% of the country’s GDP. Due to the 
US Dollar decline after the 1989-1992 
period of recession that lead to a strong 
global demand for goods and services 
“made in USA” and especially digital and 
Internet-related equipments, the US trade 
gap decreased below 1% of GDP. 
Starting with 1993, Fed begun to 
raise the interest rates as the US 
economy showed signs of robust growth. 
As consequence, the US Dollar started to 
raise on the international foreign 
exchange markets. And here is where – 
in our opinion – the Fed chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, big mistake started. 
Greenspan, as an experimented 
economist knew very well at that time as 
he knows very well today that low interest 
rates always drives people to assets 
even the inflation is in check. Fed was 
not and is not a central bank like any 
other – it has to manage the dollar’s 
fortune and the dollar was and is the 
world’s reserve currency. He mistakenly 
thought that rising interest rates at a 
moderate pace despite a high rate of 
growth and increasing in value of assets 
could bring economic growth forever and 
keep the trade gap in check due to a “not 
rising too fast currency”. In fact, inflation 
in US was higher than PPI and CPI 
showed and that because the price of 
houses and other domestic assets did 
increase faster and much more than 
those of commodities that were took into 
account at the calculus of PPI and CPI. 
Rising price in assets always means 
potential losing in productivity. And 
people went in assets, many of them 
buying houses and real estate. And the 
prices of houses and real estate 
skyrocketed.  
On the other hand it’s true that 
Fed had to deal with the Mexican crisis in 
1994, the Argentinean crisis in 1997, the 
currency disorders in Eastern Asia in 
1997-1998, the Euro introduction-related 
currency disorders in Europe in mid and 
late 90 and with ailing Japan’s economy 
and its banking system collapse. In this 
kind of respect we do consider that the 
Fed efforts to keep the dollar as down as 
possible was not a good thing. It’s true 
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that the dollar is a save haven was 
correct and the dollar was maybe higher 
than the interest rates in US could 
brought it in terms of yields of 
governments fixed income issues. But, 
despite the high yields on US credit 
markets, the US yield curves on the 10-
year T-bond and the 30-year T-bond 
were too horizontal compared to the pace 
of growth in terms of GDP. And that 
meant loses in productivity. Fed didn’t 
take too seriously the mini-recession of 
1995-1996, when, despite a weaker-
than-ever dollar, the US international 
trade deficit fail to improve. This was a 
sign of losing competitiveness (the 






The recovery that came after 
was poor in terms of productivity and 
inflamed the price of US domestic assets. 
Greenspan was misguided by the low 
prices of gold, oil and other basic 
commodities that were keeping the 
“conventional calculated inflation (PPI 
and CPI)” in check. The truth is that 
versatile investors had understood that 
Fed didn’t accurately evaluate the 
situation and – while realizing that the US 
housing market hadn’t reach its pick – 
stepped into housing and real estate and 
into housing-related financial assets like 
home equity funds. That was the main 
reason the prices of commodities hadn’t 
rise. More else, the US banking 
regulators were taking by surprise by the 
banking system new means to raise 
cash: increasing trade with less liquid 
collateral debt obligations (CDO) and 
credit default swaps (CDS)-backed 
securities. Far from trying to unwind 
those practices, Greenspan called them 
“innovations”! The WTC terrorist attacks 
that marked the beginning of the mini-
recession of 2001-2002 and lowered the 
dollar did make no improvement in the 
US trade deficit. This was the very sign 
that the US productivity reserve reached 
its end. Wise investors had already been 
on “exit” from the US housing and real 
estate market and from exotic CDO-
based issues. The terrorist attacks were 
only a reason like anyone else to ignite 
the exit of wise investors – they were to 
do the same thing at one or other 
moment of time. We have to add to the 
picture the totally uninspired fiscal policy 
of Bush administration it chose to deal 
with the situation: the lowering of taxes. 
This move released more cash at the 
disposal of ordinary people that followed 
the existing trend: they bought houses 
and bought a lot of housing-related 
goods, majority of them manufactured 
overseas. It was a scaring picture: 
higher-than-ever asset prices, a 
deteriorating budget deficit, a ballooning 
trade deficit and a weakening dollar. 
Such a picture means no productivity 
gains. The “growth” that followed the mini 
recession of 2001-2002 was only an 
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And, starting with the end of 
2001, Greenspan begun to make its final 
mistake: he conceded the political 
pressures and started to lower the 
interest rates. And the dollar went down 
without any improvement in the US trade 
gap. In fact, the US Dollar came down 
from around 0.9 US$/EUR at the end of 
2001 to some 1.5 -1.55 US$/EUR at the 
beginning of 2008 while the US trade gap 
tripled from a some US$ 20 billion a 
month in 2001 to around US$ 60 billion a 
month in 2008. In spite of lower Fed 
interest rates, the yield curve in US gave 
signs of inversion, starting earlier in 
2005. Even Greenspan declared himself 
“surprised” by this thing in his July 2005 
Humphrey Hawkins semiannual 
testimony before the Senate Banking 
Committee, but played down risks of 
recession citing strong domestic demand 
and betting on a slow decrease in houses 
and real estate prices. But Greenspan 
failed to notice even a bigger paradox: 
the combination between a weakening 
dollar and an increasing trade deficit. He 
simply ignored that “growth” 
accompanied with enlarging trade deficit 
meant and always will mean lack of 
productivity and asset bubble. In this kind 
of respect we speculate that even at that 
time maybe it was not too late for 
Greenspan to sacrifice on short term the 
“growth” US had experienced at that time 
by starting to hike the interest rates. The 
result could have been consistent with a 
slow indeed decrease in home prices and 
could also have forced the driving forces 
in the economy to seek productivity. 
Even that the breakdown in price of 
assets could have happened brutally (as 
it did) and the unemployment could have 
got higher, Greenspan should have had 
to release that those things are 
unavoidable anyway and was (and is) far 
much better to confront layoffs and 
decline in home prices at high interest 
rates rather than at low interest rates: the 
raises in productivity could (and would!) 
eventually have solved those issues. 
Greenspan also didn’t realize that, in 
spite of lax monetary policy, cash could 
(and did!) easily become scarce without 
productivity. More else, in the absence of 
adequate regulations, if started earlier 
(let’s say 2003), a tighter monetary policy 
could also have putted to a short end the 
dangerous trade with not liquid home 
equities based CDOs and CDSs between 
banks and unwind the greedy and 
reckless subprime practices that, finally, 
brought the fallout of Bear Sterns and 
Lehman Brothers, in early 2008. We 
have to add to the picture that the 
deregulations operated in the mid 90s on 
the housing market went too far and 
many people from Fed and the Treasury 
Department knew this very well. In this 
kind of respect is very hard to conceive 
that “government sponsored” entities like 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
allowed to be market makers by 
themselves and bring further distortions 
on the market using the taxpayers 
money! 
As part of this discussion, still 
remains the question if a stronger dollar 
which had been expected if we had seen 
hikes in interest rates starting with 2003 
could or could not have had a bad impact 
on the trade deficit. The answer is: 
maybe yes, but the gains in productivity 
and innovation would eventually have 
fixed the problem on mid and long term.  
  But this is the past. The done 
things are to remain nothing but done. 
The US housing market crashed and a 
lot of financial institutions went bankrupt. 
In this kind of situation, a lax monetary 
policy from Fed does make sense. But 
even at the actual 0% to 0.25% Fed 
funds rate, banks are reticent in lending 
money in order to re-launch the growth 
and that because (yet!) they don’t see 
any source of creating added value 
products. In times like this, fiscal stimulus 
packages usually do work and that’s 
exactly (and correctly, in our opinion) the 
Treasury Department has done: the 
Treasury accepted Fed to make a rare 
open market operation called 
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way, this operation enabled Fed to 
release some US$1.3 trillion that have to 
be covered with long term government 
backed securities. But this is only a part 
of the operation. The Treasury also 
agreed, between other things, to buy 
CDOs and CDSs for an amount of some 
US$ 300 billion in order to clean the 
asset portfolios of banks involved in 
transactions with such strange kind of 
financial papers. 
  Of course, such huge amount of 
US Dollars drove the dollar further down 
on forex markets, and this put the trade 
gap down from about US$ 60 billion a 
month in 2007 to some 25 to US$ 30 
billion starting with early 2009. In this 
kind of respect, we have to point out that 
the trade gap was brought down more by 
the lack of cash in US and less by the 
adding in competitiveness due to a 
weaker dollar. 
In the meantime, the IMF, having 
US as main shareholder launched an 
unprecedented action to lend money, 
especially to emerging economies. So, 
the quantitative easing was made not 
only for the US economy but also to 
sustain the assets in the entire world. A 
worldwide fall of assets prices could be a 
mess for the international financial and 
banking system and that could bring a 
huge global economic depression. While 
sustaining the world sensible economies 
and keeping down the dollar, the US 
trade gap is likely to improve as the US 
high added value tech sector shows 
some credible signs of revival. Also, a 
weak dollar will put further pressure on 
China’s unfair trade practices. Speaking 
about China, our opinion is that it seems 
very unlikely to sell on forex some part of 
its US$ 2 trillion People’s Bank of China. 
Such a move could bring further pressure 
on the dollar by making the Chinese 
made products more expensive in US. In 
this kind of respect we strongly believe 
that China is not in such a good position 
that many people are tempted to believe: 
China, at least for the time being, does 
produce only small added value products 
and, sooner or later, the competitive 
advance it has, due to its literally cheap 
workforce will disappear. In the same 
kind of respect, we also have to add to 
the picture that the international trade 
doesn’t count too much in the US GDP 
and that makes US less vulnerable that 
many analysts believe to the global 
demand for goods and services. Also, we 
have to point out (the following figure, 
source:http://www.marktaw.com/culture_
and_media/TheUSTradeDeficit.html) that 
a lot of very high added value products 
like high tech military equipments or high 
performance computers are banned to be 
exported by the US federal 
administration. But it’s true that a strong 
global demand, especially for civil high 
tech equipments, does mean a really 
strong stimulus in creating high added 




But, sustaining global assets in 
order to escape a liquidity trap that 
occurred in the US economy cannot be 
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the Japan case in late 90s and early 
years of the 2000 decade, using this 
huge “quantitative easing” measure, US 
consciously ignited an also huge “US 
Dollar carry trade” phenomenon. 
Compared with the magnitude of this 
existing dollar carry trade, the passed 
Japanese yen carry trade means almost 
nothing. 
  But, this time, the US authorities 
seem to be aware of what is happening. 
Once the growth will come back in the 
global economy (and there are a lot of 
good signs concerning this issue), Fed 
will start to increase the interest rates 
and the US Dollar will start to rise and 
that will be to unwind the dollar carry 
trade. If the things will follow the right 
direction, when the dollar will start to rise, 
the US trade gap will be small enough 
that US will afford to allow it to enlarge, 
with one and single condition: at that 
time, US will been already generated 
some quite strong added value the way 
that it will be able, despite its “new” kind 
of trade gap , to make really strong 
capital gains in terms of competitiveness 
and due to its new productivity 
improvements. This way, US will be 
again a huge market (of different kind, 
but still huge) for the most goods and 
services produced all over the world and 
the stop in the dollar carry trade will be 
mild and smooth. 
 
3. Conclusions 
   
The chance that things will 
happen this way is really big. The US is 
and will remain for quite sometime the 






More else, the US economy has 
a flexibility that any other country don’t 
even dare to dream on. And, despite the 
recent “not so good things” concerning 
the moral hazard, but considering its yet 
not matched corporate sector and its 
unique universities, still remains the best 
place in the world to create high added 
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